Court Exhibit·4 JUN 2007
Price Your Distribution Power Honestly
When a partner asks for the same price on a worse deal, the right answer starts with naming what you're actually buying.
Source document — Apple EMG Deal Review — Google Search Partnership Presentation (June 4, 2007) · United States v. Google LLC (Search) · 1:20-cv-03010 (DCD), Trial Ex. UPX0126 — DOJ public archive (page 1)
Excerpt · In Jeff Shardell's own words
Deal Overview
• Current deal terms: Google default (and exclusive) search provider in Safari browser; 50% Net Revenue Share after 10% deductions for queries stemming from the Apple browser chrome; term through January 2008.
• What Apple wants: Launching Safari for PCs and wants current deal terms to apply to this new OS; Google to be one of two possible choices for search provider (not default), with user required to choose search provider prior to using browser; Apple wants current deal terms to extend to Safari browser for PC OS; contract open re: OS, but requires Google to be the default search provider to qualify for revenue share.
• Key issues: Apple uncooperative vis-à-vis Google's efforts on Chrome utilizing their open source platform; strategic considerations with respect to supporting PC version of Safari vis-à-vis Chrome launch plans; revenue share seems rich for non-default and non-exclusive deal.
Impact if Existing Deal Terms
• Likely Scenario: Assume new browser has same chrome query growth as Firefox had in its first year; apply the rev share we give Safari (45% of gross); annual rev share payment to Apple would = $90M.
• Aggressive Scenario: Assume new browser comes out of the gate with the same worldwide market share as Firefox (20%); annual rev share payment to Apple would = $205M.
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How this surfaced
- Source type
- Court Exhibit
- Case / record
- United States v. Google LLC (Search)
- Citation
- 1:20-cv-03010 (DCD), Trial Ex. UPX0126 — DOJ public archive
- Date authored
- June 4, 2007
- License
- Public domain
- Original
- View the primary source →
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